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Recent reviews and textbooks celebrate the ubiquitous implications of cognitive 
processes in the formation, use, and modification of stereotypes. Gordon Allport was in many 
ways the source of this “monomania” since he first drew scholars’ attention to the role of 
cognition in stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination. Interestingly, Allport suggested that not 
only twisted and sick minds rely on unwarranted generalizations. Rather, he emphasized the 
normality of people’s faulty perceptions of social groups. In so doing, he claimed the study of 
prejudice and stereotyping as part of mainstream social psychology. Importantly, although 
Allport is known to have anticipated much of the later work on cognitive processes, he also 
emphasized the influence of motivational concerns in social perception. Over the years, it has 
become increasingly clear that motivational concerns must be fully integrated with cognitively-
tuned approaches to stereotyping and prejudice. The field is only now achieving this kind of 
integration. 
In the present chapter, we first provide a brief overview of the main ideas developed in 
Allport’s chapter 10, The Cognitive Process.  As will become clear, cognitive limitations and 
partisanship are the recurrent themes of this founding text.  In a second section, we discuss the 
most significant subsequent advances in understanding the process of categorization and 
stereotyping. In the third section, we emphasize the role of motivation in stereotyping and 
illustrate how current research provides evidence for the interplay of cognitive and motivational 
factors in the use of stereotypes. We conclude by suggesting promising avenues for future 
research. 
Allport’s Views on the Cognitive Process… and Motivated Cognition 
In the opening section of his chapter, The Cognitive Process, Allport emphasized the 
idea, also developed by the New Look movement (Bruner, 1957), that perceivers are active 
witnesses of their environment. Perception is as much affected by the perceiver, “the light 
within” as Allport called it, as by the object of perception, “the light without” (1954/1979, p. 
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165). Allport stressed the role of meaning construction in social perceptions as well, noting that 
both cognitive and motivational factors determine people’s interpretation of the social 
environment. After Allport, cognitively-oriented social psychologists long concentrated on the 
former aspects and compared people’s cognitive performance to so-called objective accounts of 
the surrounding world (Hamilton & Trolier, 1986). More recently, the role of motivation in 
social judgment has very much been rediscovered. Nowadays, most students of stereotyping and 
prejudice would agree that reality constraints (i.e., the light without) and motivational concerns 
(i.e., the light within) both shape social judgment (Leyens, Yzerbyt & Schadron, 1992, 1994). 
As a matter of fact, several propositions in Allport’s chapter are quite cognitive in tone 
and can be seen as prefiguring later social cognition work (see Fiske, this volume). First, he 
proposed that categories and categorization are tools that not only help people to deal with the 
complexity of the environment but also guide their thoughts and actions. Second, Allport 
discussed the structural aspects of categories, such as the appropriate features thought to define 
a category (similarity and association) and the hierarchical relations among categories 
(subordinate and super-ordinate). A central idea regarding the internal characteristics of 
categories is that people sometimes hold “monopolistic” categories in which all category 
members are thought to be interchangeable. It is in this sense that people’s reliance on 
categories is supposedly based on the “principle of least effort”: in order to reduce at low cost 
the uncertainty of their social environment, perceivers treat all members of a social group as 
being alike. A final section linked cognitive processes to dispositional factors, a theme that still 
is at the heart of many contemporary efforts in the field (see Duckitt, this volume). 
In addition to the emphasis on cognition, several portions of the chapter alluded to the 
influence of vested interests on social impressions and judgments. One section dealt with the 
consequences of people’s attachment to pre-existing knowledge. It is in this context that Allport 
discussed the role of “selection, accentuation, and interpretation” as providing a way to keep 
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mental categories largely intact. Specifically, people rely on categorical thinking not only to 
overcome the limitation of their attentional capacities, but also to avoid repeated modifications 
of their views about others. Perhaps most illustrative of the intrusion of motivational concerns in 
people’s thinking is what Allport called “autistic” thinking. In contrast to rational, so-called 
“directed” thinking, perceivers often reason in self-serving terms. “There is nothing passive 
about thinking”, Allport noted (1954/1979, p. 167). The rationalization process that 
accompanies autistic thinking crystallizes around some form of simple human agency (e.g., 
blaming a scapegoat for one’s problems), and neglects complex situational factors that may 
enter the picture (see Glick, this volume).  
Again, whereas researchers’ curiosity initially concerned the cognitive processes 
responsible for perceivers’ partial appraisal of their social environement, the latest research 
efforts also aimed at better understanding the motivational factors that contribute to people’s 
partisan view of the social world. To the extent that Allport considered the interplay of 
cognition and motivation to be the hallmark of social perception, the more balanced view 
advocated in contemporary work comes across as a tribute to the perspective he already 
championed half a century ago. 
Developments Since Allport: What Have We Learned 
One of Allport’s most provocative and inspiring ideas was that stereotyping is grounded 
in a basic, unavoidable, categorization process. People are not capable of thought in the absence 
of concepts. New experiences remain meaningless unless they are incorporated into pre-existing 
categories. Open-mindedness, Allport noted, “is considered to be a virtue. But strictly speaking, 
it cannot occur. A new experience must be redacted into old categories.” (1954/1979, p. 20).  
Categorical Thinking: The Cognitive Side of the Coin 
Categorization is a prerequisite for human thinking for it gives meaning to new 
experiences. It also facilitates learning and guides people’s adjustments to the social world. By 
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abstracting sensory inputs, categorization allows individuals to quickly interpret, and react to, 
their environment. The act of categorization however deprives people from perceiving some 
aspects of the world: stimuli can be assimilated to the category only if their peculiarities are 
overlooked. Here resides the dual nature of categorization: “Categorical thinking is a natural and 
inevitable tendency of the human mind” and “has property of guiding daily adjustments” 
(Allport, 1954/1979, pp.170-171), but it also impoverishes experiences and leads to a host of 
perceptual, judgmental, and memory biases. 
One famous piece of evidence for the biasing impact of categorization on perception 
comes from a study by Tajfel and Wilkes (1963). Like Allport, Tajfel and Wilkes conceived 
categorization (and stereotyping) to result in the overestimation of inter-group differences and 
intra-group resemblances. Participants estimated the length of a series of lines that varied from 
each other by regular increments. When shorter lines (As) were systematically given a different 
label than longer lines (Bs), participants overestimated the differences between the categories. 
This basic categorization effect applies to estimates about attitudes, traits, or even physical 
values (e.g., Krueger & Clement, 1994) and points to the biasing influence of categorization. 
However, it seems most pronounced when the judgment is uncertain, such as when participants 
communicate their estimates in an unfamiliar measurement unit (Corneille, Klein, Lambert, & 
Judd, 2002). This is consistent with Allport’s view that the “whole purpose (of categories) 
seems to be to facilitate perception and conduct – in other words, to make our adjustment to life 
speedy, smooth, and consistent.” (1954/1979, p.21). 
Whereas Tajfel and Wilkes provided evidence that categorization leads perceivers to 
overestimate the difference between groups, later work confirmed that categorization also 
reduces the perceived variability within categories. For instance, stimuli belonging to the same 
category are more perceptually confusable than are cross-category stimuli (Harnad, 1987). This 
effect is consistent with Allport’s claim that “categories assimilate as much old and new 
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experience as possible to themselves” (1954/1979, p. 170). Beyond the implications of 
categorization for perception and judgment, Allport also noted that the categorization process 
implies a comparison between an old and an incoming representation. Categorization therefore 
involves a memory component. A straightforward illustration of the biasing impact of 
categorization on memory can be found in the “who-said-what” paradigm: people are more 
likely to misremember face-statement associations within than between groups (e.g., Taylor, 
Fiske, Etcoff, & Ruderman, 1978). For instance, individuals are more likely to misattribute a 
statement by a female speaker to another female than to another male speaker. More recently, 
categorization has also been shown to bias people’s visual memory. Faces that are moderately 
typical of an Asian person will be misremembered as being more Asian-like than they are 
(Corneille, Huart, Bécquart & Brédart, 2004). Research in social cognition has demonstrated a 
growing interest in how categorical thinking moderates basic memory processes. 
Categorization is aimed at reducing uncertainties, but uncertainty reduction comes at the 
cost of increased inaccuracy in perceptions, judgments, and memories. As Allport 
acknowledged, inaccuracy is difficult to estimate in the context of social judgments: “nature 
does not tell us which (categorical) attributes are defining, which merely probable, and which 
totally fallacious.” (1954/1979, p. 172; see Judd & Park, this volume, for a discussion of 
stereotype accuracy). Allport further suggested that as pragmatic perceivers, people choose 
when to make this trade-off. He noted “While most of us have learned to be critical and open-
minded in certain regions of experience we obey the law of least effort in others. A doctor will 
not be swiped by folk generalizations concerning arthritis, snake bite, or the efficacy of aspirin. 
But he may be content with overgeneralizations concerning politics, social insurances, or 
Mexicans… Life is just too short to have differentiated concepts about everything. A few 
pathways are enough for us to walk in.” (p. 173).  
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Because, by definition, people are experts in different and limited domains, a logical 
consequence of Allport’s view is that most social concepts are under-differentiated. 
Accordingly, Allport noted that: “One consequence of least effort in group categorizing is that a 
belief in essence develops.” (1954/1979, p. 173-174). This subjective essentialism argument, 
i.e., the view that people tend to overestimate the homogeneity, consistency, and durability of 
social categories, has become a lively topic of research in recent intergroup relations work (for a 
collection, see Yzerbyt, Judd, & Corneille, 2004). 
The idea of differentiated thinking and expertise is also at the heart of the numerous 
efforts on the contact hypothesis (Pettigrew & Tropp, 1998, this volume; Kenworthy, Hewstone, 
Turner, & Voci, this volume) and of abundant research on stereotype change (Hewstone, 1994). 
According to Allport, perceivers avoid simplifications when given a chance to acquire rich sets 
of information. That is, “the more they know about a group the less likely they are to form 
monopolistic categories” (Allport, 1954/1979, p. 172, emphasis original). The belief that people 
stay away from inflexible categories if they become acquainted with members of a stigmatized 
group is of course very optimistic. As anticipated by Allport, research has shown that a series of 
stringent conditions need to be met in order to change people’s views about social groups. 
Clearly, one has to do more than provide information about members of a stigmatized group 
when attempting to change people’s representations about this group (Gaertner & Dovidio, 
2000), if only because perceivers are biased in their incorporation of group-attribute covariations 
(Hamilton & Gifford, 1976; but see McGarty, 2002). 
In the early 1980s, researchers examined in more detail the cognitive factors that may be 
responsible for the inertia of stereotypes. The first paradigm to be used asked whether perceivers 
would disregard their faulty generalizations more or less as a function of the magnitude and 
distribution of counter-stereotypical information about group members (Hewstone, 1994). As 
many studies revealed, people’s reactions are best described in terms of the so-called “subtyping 
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strategy” according to which people resist changing their stereotypes if they can group 
inconsistencies together in a few individuals. This strategy elaborates on Allport’s notion that 
exceptional individuals are “fenced off” as not being like the rest of the group. This “structural” 
paradigm inspired a closer examination of the way perceivers approach information about 
groups. Do they favor a consideration of various subgroups within a larger group, a strategy 
commonly encountered when people’s own group is at stake, or do they subtype the “deviants” 
so as to oppose a majority of stereotypic group members (all students) to a limited number of 
exceptions to the rule (Park, Wolsko & Judd, 2001). For instance, there are various subgroups 
among university students, like “nerds”, “party-animals” or “artists” to name but a few, allowing 
to accommodate for a great range of behaviors among students. In contrast to a subtyping 
strategy, approaching a group in terms of its diversity is a good way to insure a moderate view, 
one that keeps all group members under the same umbrella and offers limited room for 
oversimplified conceptions regarding group members. 
Because Allport considered stereotypes to be mainly a matter of (non)expertise, he 
appeared somewhat less sensitive to the circumstances under which categorical thinking is more 
or less prevalent within a given individual. Modern social cognition has been extremely prolific 
on this front. The thrust of the message is that the initial selection of a particular category 
(stereotype activation) and its further use (stereotype application) depend on a number of factors 
that relate to the perceiver, to the structure of the information, and to the circumstances in which 
information processing takes place (for integrative models, see Bodenhausen & Macrae, 1998; 
Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Kunda & Spencer, 2003). 
Stereotype activation. As far as stereotype activation is concerned, the intrinsic salience 
of certain characteristics (such as race, age, or gender; Brewer & Lui, 1989) or their temporary 
salience in a situation due to their rarity or surprising nature (Taylor & Fiske, 1978) influence 
people’s selection of one specific category over another. Chronic or transient goals are also 
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important factors that orient the way perceivers approach other people in a given situation. 
Finally, stereotypic knowledge can become accessible even when perceivers remain unaware 
that it has been evoked in the first place. 
Although category activation was long thought to require basically no intellectual 
resources, this assumption has now been challenged (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991). Interestingly, it 
has been proposed that the activation of a particular category may inhibit the activation of 
competing categories. In an illustrative experiment, Macrae and Bodenhausen (1995) had 
participants look at an Asian woman putting on make-up (to make gender salient) or eating rice 
(to make ethnicity salient). This encounter made stereotypically related words more accessible 
than control words. In contrast, the words associated with the opposing stereotype became less 
accessible (Bodenhausen & Macrae, 1998). 
Stereotype application. Although category activation may well be pervasive in social 
perceptions, people do not invariably apply their stereotypic knowledge once a category label 
has been activated. Not surprisingly, assimilation to the activated constructs will depend on a 
host of situational constraints (Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 2000; Macrae & Johnston, 
1998) and personal characteristics (Smeesters et al., 2003).  
In general, enhanced motivation and sufficient capacity to process fine-grained 
information increase perceivers’ likelihood of attending to individuating information (rather 
than applying stereotypes). A striking example comes from a demonstration that “morning 
people” (vs. “night people”) are more likely to be influenced by their stereotypes when 
confronted with a judgment task late (vs. early) in the day (Bodenhausen, 1990). In other words, 
more stereotyping is obtained when perceivers lack the energy to fulfill the judgment task than 
when they can count on their full intellectual vigor. 
As Allport anticipated, applying stereotypes saves intellectual resources. Not only do 
stereotypes intrude more on judgments when there is a dearth of cognitive energy (Gilbert & 
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Hixon, 1991; Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994) but access to categorical labels may free 
intellectual resources that can be redirected toward other tasks. Although circumstances in 
which resources are scarce encourage the application of stereotypic knowledge (Dijksterhuis & 
Bargh, 2001), however, people may switch to more sophisticated (and costly) forms of thinking 
if able and motivated to do so. Social cognition work conducted over the last two decades 
provides ample evidence that strategic, individual, and situational factors moderate people’s 
inclination toward “differentiated thinking.” As we show in the next section, research on the 
role of integrity concerns lends even more credence to this assertion. 
A New Framework: Autistic Thinking, the Motivational Side of The Coin
 
A noteworthy aspect of Allport’s cognitive approach of intergroup perceptions is the 
view that categorical thinking is often directed at serving self-interests. This form of reasoning, 
which Allport called “autistic thinking,” is at the heart of various recent lines of work (Leyens, 
Yzerbyt, & Schadron, 1992, 1994) and is nicely illustrated in the research conducted by Kunda 
and her colleagues on “motivated reasoning with stereotypes” (Kunda & Spencer, 2003). When 
confronted with a member of a stigmatized category (e.g., an Asian doctor), people may choose 
to appraise this target using one among several categorical bases (e.g., doctor or Asian). The 
selection of a particular category depends upon the way the interaction unfolds. If the target 
somehow frustrates the well-being of the perceiver or counters self-enhancement goals, the more 
derogatory category will impose itself whereas the more flattering category will be inhibited. Of 
importance too, although stereotypes may well be activated at early stages of an interaction, 
activation is not always found to last very long (Kunda, Davies, Adams, & Spencer, 2002). 
Chances are then that stereotypes will not be applied to a target at a later stage of the interaction 
unless some event (e.g., the emergence of a disagreement) triggers a need for people to fall back 
on their a priori views. That perceivers switch back and forth to stereotypes as a function of their 
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relevance for the task at hand is consistent with the view that stereotypes are used when they 
prove useful in guiding perceivers’ behavior. 
In the above work, the reactions vis-à-vis the target person result from the nature of the 
interaction. Sometimes personal threats or frustrations influence judgments even when they are 
only incidentally related to the interaction. Research confirms that people change the way they 
perceive an out-group member when their self-worth has been challenged in an otherwise 
unrelated episode. Indeed, Fein and Spencer (1997) found that compared to people who initially 
receive positive feedback about their intelligence, those who learn that they have failed a test 
express more derogatory judgments when the feedback provider is Jewish (a stigmatized 
category) than when she is not. Moreover, the more the threatened individuals derogate the 
Jewish candidate, the better they feel afterwards. Whereas the above work establishes the impact 
of self-threats on stereotype application, similar conclusions have been reported at the activation 
level. 
Allport hypothesized that
 “the process of perception-cognition is distinguished for three 
operations that it performs on the ‘light without.’ It selects, accentuates, and interprets the 
sensory data” (1954/1979, p. 166). This claim is supported by work on hypothesis confirmation 
(Snyder, 1984). People working under the guidance of a particular hypothesis, and a stereotyped 
category would certainly qualify here, tend to rely on strategies that uncover evidence that 
supports rather than questions the validity of this hypothesis. 
Numerous studies confirm that people are indeed highly selective in the information they 
collect to test their hypotheses about others, and that
 
accentuation, biased interpretation, and 
selective memory often favor confirmatory evidence. In a study by Darley and Gross (1983), 
participants watched an ambiguous video showing a girl performing a number of scholastic 
tests. Participants who had initially been told that the girl was from a poor socioeconomic 
background saw a much poorer performance than those who believed she was from a wealthy 
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family (see also, Yzerbyt, Schadron, Rocher & Leyens, 1994). A disturbing message emanating 
from hypothesis confirmation work is that perceiver’s initial hypotheses are likely to create a 
reality that eventually confirms their initial stereotypical expectations.
 
In sharp contrast with a simple-minded “energy-saving device” view sometimes 
advocated by social cognition researchers, a view by which cognitive resources would be 
associated with a decreased impact of stereotypes, the work on hypothesis confirmation suggests 
that, when confronted with contradictory evidence, people may devote considerable resources in 
order to save the structure and content of their categories. Indeed, people have been found to 
exert a substantial amount of cognitive work in order to avoid revising their current views (Ditto 
& Lopez, 1992; Yzerbyt & Leyens, 1991). 
Consistent with Allport’s view on stereotype preservation, various studies on stereotype 
change have emphasized the active role that perceivers play in keeping their preconceptions 
intact. Kunda and Oleson (1995) found that the presence of an irrelevant piece of information 
facilitated perceivers’ work in fencing off the deviant. Initially neutral, the irrelevant 
information was now deemed to “explain” the deviance, allowing perceivers to keep their 
general expectations intact. Only when no irrelevant information was provided were perceivers 
forced to integrate the information about the deviant in their representation of the group as a 
whole. There are thus limits to people’s ability to bend reality.  
The issue is not only whether additional information gives room for the reinterpretation 
of the evidence, but also whether perceivers enjoy the necessary cognitive resources to actively 
salvage their cherished beliefs. As a matter of fact, research reveals that perceivers confronted 
with a deviant group member manage to dismiss this inconsistency (thereby retaining the 
original stereotype unaltered) unless they face another cognitively-demanding task (in which 
case their general stereotype is weakened) (Yzerbyt, Coull & Rocher, 1999). “Fencing off” a 
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deviant is a job that comes with its attentional cost, one that people are nevertheless willing to 
pay if this can help them to maintain their preconceptions. 
That people are ready to invest resources to keep with their initial views and feel 
compelled to work hard when unexpected evidence pops up is not only detailed in work on 
person memory, hypothesis confirmation, and stereotype change. This pattern has been reported 
in many other areas, such as attribution and persuasion. All in all, social cognition work is thus 
strongly compatible with the idea that perceivers have a vested interest in the inertia of their 
beliefs. In line with lessons from attitude change research, our prediction is that stereotypes are 
likely to be even more resistant if they survive a stage of thorough examination during which 
perceivers actively reaffirm them. It would thus seem that stereotypes can emerge in two rather 
different contexts. Besides being handy interpretations of the evidence, highly susceptible to 
being abandoned or modified whenever more attention is devoted to the stimulus information, 
they may also result from a thorough rationalization process and should then be seen as deeply 
rooted beliefs likely to resist most contradictory facts. 
Does this mean that people are never motivated to stay away from stereotypes? Not 
necessarily. Whereas contemporary work acknowledges the role of integrity concerns and 
enhancement goals on stereotype maintenance, other studies suggest that perceivers can be eager 
to avoid stereotyping. This can occur because people are motivated to live up to personal 
standards or social prescriptions of fairness, resulting in attempts at stereotype suppression (for a 
review, see Monteith, Devine & Sherman, 1998; Devine, this volume). Research on mental 
control suggests that this commendable line of action may not always be the ideal strategy it 
seems to be at first sight. Indeed, because suppression apparently activates the very stereotype 
people wish to combat, stereotypic materials can become even more accessible during later 
encounters with members of the target group, causing a “rebound” effect of stereotypes on 
judgment and behavior when suppression is no longer enforced (Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne & 
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Jetten, 1994). The paradoxical consequences of suppression are also demonstrated in studies 
showing that perceivers initially asked to suppress a stereotype later preferentially recalled 
(Macrae et al., 1996) and recognized (Sherman et al., 1997) stereotype-consistent over 
stereotype-inconsistent materials presented during the suppression episode. 
Is it then best to forego suppression altogether? This would be a premature conclusion as 
some people seem able to suppress activated stereotypes without incurring the cost of rebound 
effects (for a review, see Monteith et al., 1998). For instance, Monteith, Spicer and Tooman 
(1998) found that low-prejudice participants are less susceptible to rebound effects than high-
prejudice participants. Presumably, low-prejudice people are more motivated to control the 
application of cultural stereotypes and have more practice with such control than their high-
prejudice counterparts. To be sure, the impact of egalitarian goals or norms may also be situated 
at the activation stage in that low prejudice people may simply never evoke the derogatory 
stereotype in the first place (Lepore & Brown, 1997; Moskowitz, Gollwitzer, Wasel, & Schaal, 
1999). Also, it seems that not all target categories lend themselves to rebound effects as 
stereotype control is likely to be maintained on a spontaneous basis for categories that are highly 
sensitive (e.g., race). 
Has Allport Been Supported? 
 Over the five decades that followed the publication of The Nature of Prejudice, 
researchers have embraced Allport’s ideas regarding the role of cognitive processes and 
accumulated an impressive series of findings establishing the central role of categorization and 
stereotypes in the formation, use, and change of beliefs about groups. As key tools in people’s 
dealings with the social environment, stereotypes are likely to prevail not only when perceivers 
lack the ability and motivation to deal in a scrupulous and impartial way with the stimuli they 
encounter but also when they are attached to a particular interpretation of the world or are 
otherwise frustrated in their pursuit of a positive view of themselves and their reference groups.  
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The gap in conceptualization and indeed often-mentioned tension between seeing 
stereotypes as a energy-saving cognitive shortcuts or cherished explanations of the surrounding 
world has probably fueled some misunderstanding between the two most productive lines of 
work on stereotypes and intergroup relations, namely social cognition and social identity (for a 
similar point, see Abrams & Hogg, 1998; Leyens, Yzerbyt & Schadron, 1994). For the latter 
strand of research, stereotypes are used for the purpose of giving meaning, asserting perceived 
hierarchies between groups, and emphasizing group identities. For the former, stereotypes are 
simplifying devices that allow individual perceivers to deal with incoming stimuli in a manner 
that alleviates the burden of complexity. The growing role afforded to self-promoting goals or 
even social concerns within social cognition work and a closer consideration for the cognitive 
dimensions of stereotyping within social identity work offers great promise for future 
convergence of these two approaches. 
Future Directions 
In our opinion, four research topics have started to attract and will increasingly draw the 
attention of researchers in the next few years. The first concerns the impact of people’s social 
position on their processing of social information. Factors as diverse as the power people have 
(e.g., Corneille & Yzerbyt, 2002; Fiske, 1993; Guinote, Judd & Brauer, 2002), the immediate 
audience they have to face (Stangor, Sechrist & Jost, 2001; Yzerbyt & Carnaghi, 2003), or the 
moral credentials they enjoy (Monin, & Miller, 2001) have all been shown to shape people’s 
reactions to groups and group members (see also Jackman’s and Rudman’s chapters in this 
volume). In our view, research on these and related topics will likely receive enhanced attention 
in the forthcoming years.  
Second, we see a growing interest in how people’s communication about the reality of 
groups and group members is affected by and indeed shapes social representations. The way 
stereotypes are formed, established, and changed through communication is a fascinating - yet 
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quite neglected - issue that researchers have just started to examine (Kashima, 2000; Ruscher, 
2001). A better recognition of the fact that categories about groups are a social product as much 
as they are an outcome of individual cognitive processes is a central endeavor for future research 
(McGarty, Yzerbyt & Spears, 2002).  
Third, emotions have received an increasing amount of attention in the domain of 
intergroup relations (see also Smith & Mackie, this volume). This research has concerned the 
impact of people’s mood on their processing of category and individual information (e.g., 
Bodenhausen, 1993), the beliefs people hold about the nature of emotions experienced by 
members of different groups (Leyens et al., 2000), or the emotions people experience as a 
function of their self-categorization into, and identification with, groups (e.g., Mackie, Devos, & 
Smith, 2000; Yzerbyt, Dumont, Gordijn & Wigboldus, 2001). 
Finally, the possibilities offered by the tools of mental imagery, and the current attention 
devoted to neuroscience issues, suggest a growing interest in the psychophysiological and 
neurophysiological correlates of stereotyping and prejudice. This emerging area has been the 
subject of recent symposia (e.g., see the special issue of the Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology – Attitudes and Social Cognition, October 2003, on this topic). 
Half a century ago, the path opened by Allport in his groundbreaking work made clear 
that the boundaries of people’s cognitive apparatus and the restrictions imposed by self-interest 
likely join together to shape social judgment. For the many travelers that embraced social 
cognition, the journey has been every bit as fascinating Allport advertised it to be. Our intuition 
of what the future research holds similarly stresses the interplay of reality constraints and 
integrity concerns in the perception of groups and group members. The promise is thus for even 
more integration of cognition and motivation, a perspective Allport would surely have liked. 
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